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COLLOQUIUM
ETHICS IN CORPORATE REPRESENTATION
INTRODUCTION: THE POST-ENRON IDENTITY
CRISIS OF THE BUSINESS LAWYER
William H. Simon*
The practices and institutions of business lawyering are undergoing a
reassessment and revision as radical as anything that has occurred since the
late nineteenth century, when the modern professional association and the
modern corporate law firm were born. The pace of change has intensified,
but its directions remain contested. The articles in this colloquium depict a
corporate bar torn between competing role conceptions along a variety of
dimensions. The key axes of controversy are these:
I. WHO IS THE CLIENT? MANAGER OR INSTITUTION?

A distinguishing feature of business practice is that it typically involves
organizations, rather than individuals. Organizations are different from
individuals because they usually consist of multiple constituencies with
potentially conflicting interests. Lawyers cannot act simultaneously for
multiple conflicting interests. They need some way of deciding which
constituent interests are the organizational client's interests.
A powerful tendency discussed in these articles and in the scandals that
prompt them is to conflate the client with the managers who retain and
instruct the lawyer. The lawyer has obvious material incentives to adopt
this course, and powerful psychological forces promote it. Personal
solidarity with the people you collaborate with is one of the most satisfying
rewards of high-status work.
Every lawyer, however, knows that in principle the manager is not the
client. He knows that the client is "the entity." Yet few lawyers have been
clear about what it means to represent an entity. The tendency to identify
client with manager has persisted in part because of the vagueness of the
entity conception. It is remarkable how little effort the bar made before the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 to clarify matters. Before Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.13 appeared in 1983, there was virtually no
Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
*
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doctrinal guidance on how an organizational client differed from an
individual one. Model Rule 1.13 was ambiguous on virtually every point it
addressed, and these ambiguities
persisted until Sarbanes-Oxley forced
2
clarification of some of them.
The key precept of Model Rule 1.13 is that the lawyer represents the
organization "acting through its authorized representatives."
The
touchstone appears to be authority. Since the board has something close to
plenary authority, one tendency was to look to the board in situations where
managerial behavior is questionable or plainly wrongful. As originally
enacted, the rule gave discretion to go to the board, without requiring it.
Some lawyers, looking for a rule of thumb to replace the conflation of
entity and manager, started to think of the organization as tantamount to its
board.
Sarbanes-Oxley has intensified this trend without resolving key
ambiguities. Sarbanes-Oxley now mandates up-the-ladder reporting in a
broad range of situations where the bar would have preferred to keep it
optional. 3 At the same time, Security and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
regulations encouraged, but did not require, the adoption of structures that
make a board (Qualified Legal Compliance) committee of independent
directors the primary recipient of such reports. 4 The trend toward greater
reliance on the board is further reflected in the growing practice of hiring
separate outside counsel for independent director committees.
On the other hand, the trend has been resisted, and not just by inside
counsel. Robert Rosen's article here shows that most public corporations
have declined to adopt special committees and have charged inside counsel
with responsibility to receive up-the-ladder reports. 5 Too much compliance
responsibility at the board level may not be optimal. Outside directors and
counsel have less information than insiders and are less able to integrate
compliance decisions with other business policies. Robert Rosen, Deborah
DeMott, Sung Hui Kim, and Manuel Utset show the range of current
6
practice and the complexity of policy considerations.
Nevertheless, even after the allocation of authority between managers
and the board (or insiders and outsiders) is settled, issues of client identity
will persist. In theory, it is no more correct to conflate the organization
2. See generally William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization'sLawyer
Represent?: A Taxonomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 57 (2003); William H.
Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity:
Lawyer Responsibility for Collective

Misconduct, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 19-20, 29-34 (2005) [hereinafter Simon, Wrongs of
Ignorance].

3. See Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance, supra note 2, at 29-34.
4. Id. at 30-33.
5. Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion

of QLCCs, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1251 (2005).
6. Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 Fordham L. Rev.
955 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as

Gatekeeper, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 983 (2005); Rosen, supra note 5, at 1251; Manuel A. Utset,
A Model of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case of Lawyer Misconduct, 74 Fordham L.

Rev. 1319 (2005).
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with its board than to conflate it with its management (though in general the
former is less harmful). Where the lawyer is confronted with questionable
conduct that the board lacks authority to approve (because it requires a
shareholder vote, or breaches a fiduciary duty, or is otherwise illegal), the
board cannot be regarded as the conclusive spokesperson for the
organization. Yet the bar finds it difficult to contemplate any role for the
lawyer in this situation beyond remonstrance and withdrawal.
PreSarbanes-Oxley, the state bars divided on whether lawyers had discretion to
go beyond the board to the organization's shareholders, or a regulator, when
such a move seemed necessary to protect the organization's interests. The
SEC's Sarbanes-Oxley rules
insist lawyers have discretion to go outside,
7
but declines to mandate it.

The denial of a duty to go outside in cases of egregiously harmful
illegality is hard to square with plausible notions of professional duty. If
the organizational client is being harmed, and disclosure would mitigate the
harm, it arguably follows that disclosure is appropriate. The bar resists this
conclusion on grounds of confidentiality. It argues that, as a general matter,
clients will not consult lawyers without confidentiality safeguards, and that,
since legal advice promotes compliance with law, this will be socially
costly. But the argument is implausible. For one thing, corporate agents
have incentives for consulting lawyers that do not depend on
confidentiality. They face the prospect of increased exposure to liability for
failing to do so: for example, loss of the "advice of counsel" defense to
criminal charges or the "business judgment" defense to civil claims.
In addition, the logic of the argument suggests that the privilege should
belong to the agent, when in fact it belongs to the organization, which can
waive it when it finds it in the organizational interest to do so. Prosecutors
routinely insist on such waiver as a condition of the settlement of criminal
charges against the organization. And the privilege does not mitigate the
duty of the corporate lawyer to insure that the organization discloses
information she receives from managers that the organization is legally
required to disclose (for example, under securities or litigation discovery
rules), even when it is harmful to the manager personally. Given these
facts, it has always been irrational for a corporate manager to make a
disclosure to the organization's counsel that he would not have been willing
to make in the absence of any confidentiality guarantee. Thus, the likely
effect in terms of reduced disclosure to counsel, from requirements that
increase disclosure by counsel, is trivial.
Even if their duties stop at the board, lawyers will still have to make
judgments about when loyalty to the corporate client requires them to
remonstrate with management or climb the ladder to the board. A key issue
salient in recent scandals and still unresolved in important respects concerns
the legitimacy of transactions that are motivated primarily by a desire to
7. W. Bradley Wendel, Professional Responsibility: Examples and Explanations 79-84
(2004).
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achieve favorable accounting effects unrelated to economic effects. Many
of the Enron deals seem plainly illegal, but managers continue to feel that
they have many lawful options to engage in transactions that have no
legitimate business purpose. In her article here, Sung Hui Kim accepts the
premise that such deals are in the interests of shareholders, presumably
because they will raise share price in the short term, and thus would be
undertaken by a "faithful agent" if otherwise lawful. 8 But from another
point of view, such manipulations ought to be regarded as prima facie
violations of fiduciary duty because they are likely to compromise the
corporation's reputation for fair and accurate financial reporting and
because they distort key measures of managerial accountability to the
shareholder electorate. 9 (In addition, while some shareholders of a
particular corporation might receive a short-term benefit from accounting
manipulation-as they might from outright fraud-all shareholders are
better off in the long run if all corporations forgo it.)
II. WHO REGULATES? SELF (JUDICIAL)-REGULATION OR LAY
REGULATION?

The Enron-inspired Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the first federal statute in the
history of the republic to regulate lawyers directly and broadly. The second
came only two years later, when Congress confirmed and extended the
power of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to regulate extensively the
practice of tax lawyers. 10 Prior to these statutes, regulation of the legal
profession was considered a matter for the states and in important respects a
matter of "self-regulation."
Of course, the profession has never had formal power to regulate itself.
Power at the state level has been lodged formally in the courts, but the
courts have tended to acquiesce in the proposals of the bar associations, and
every jurisdiction has some version of the American Bar Association model
norms. Over the years, federal agencies have preempted some state rules to
regulate the lawyers who practice before them, but these moves have tended
to be narrow, and the agencies have often incorporated the profession's
norms into their own regulations. The Sarbanes-Oxley rules are a much
more dramatic step. They preempt a broad range of the bar's norms, and
their enactment reflects an explicit legislative judgment that the bar's selfregulatory efforts have been inadequate.
It seems likely that the trend toward displacement of the states and the
bar as the primary regulators of the profession will continue. The states
have inadequate jurisdictional scope to deal with key problems in practice
8. Kim, supra note 6, at 983.
9. For argument and citations, see William H. Simon, Earnings Management as a
Professional Responsibility Problem: A Comment on Steven Schwarcz's "The Limits of
Lawyering," 84 Texas L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 2005).
10. See Mark Ely et al., The Tax Shelter Rules Come Full Circle: An Analysis of the Tax
Shelter Provisions in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, BNA Tax Management

Weekly Report, Dec. 27, 2004, http://www.bnatax.com/tm/wr-taxshelterly.htm.
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that are increasingly multistate and multinational. Moreover, the track
record of self-regulation is not impressive. As Jonathan Macey argues, the
bar has often succumbed in its regulatory efforts to monopolistic selfinterest at the expense of public values." I And as Geoffrey Miller suggests,
recent changes in the economic circumstances of practice may require more
12
extensive regulatory standards and enforcement than the bar would prefer.
Increasing competition, lawyer mobility, and the attenuation of client
relations have weakened the force of informal social and reputational
pressures that previously supplemented formal public regulation.
III. WHAT EXPERTISE?: DISCIPLINARY VERSUS INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES

The shift in regulatory authority from the bar and the states to federal
administrative agencies also involves a shift from uniform regulation across
the profession to regulation differentiated by practice contexts. 13 The SEC
promulgates norms for lawyers in the securities context, the IRS for lawyers
in tax practice, and the Office of Thrift Supervision for lawyers representing
banks. This trend involves fragmentation within the profession, but it also
potentially involves integration across professions within the relevant
practice contexts.
Regulation across professions within a given practice setting would
parallel the evolving configuration of skills, tasks, and, in some respects,
the sense of professional identity. Increasingly, professionals work in
interdisciplinary teams. The composition and attitudes of these teams is
defined by the nature of the problems they work on. In some areas, we can
see a tendency of people to think of their work, less in terms of the
discipline in which they have been credentialed, and more in terms of the
problems they work on. For example, observers of drug courts have noted
that the lawyer roles there are not strongly distinguished from the roles of
probation officers, judges, and medical people. No doubt each group is
connected to one or more traditional professional associations, but all of
them also meet together in the National Association of Drug Court
4
Professionals.'
Enron provides a striking illustration of the stakes in configuring the
boundaries of expertise. Both lawyers and accountants failed in their
gatekeeping responsibilities, and Milton Regan's account suggests that part
of the problem in each case was an implausibly narrow conception of

11. Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the Idea

of a Profession, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1079 (2005).
12. Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74

Fordham L. Rev. 1105 (2005).
13. See generally David Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After

Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1147 (1993).
14. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
ExperimentalistGovernment, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 859-65 (2000).
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responsibility. 15 The accountants asked for legal opinions as authority for
many improper transactions, especially the ones involving "special purpose
entities" facilitating off-balance-sheet financing. The lawyers issued the
opinions, even in the face of doubts that the opinions had the significance
under the relevant accounting standards that the auditors attributed to them.
In the wake of the collapse, the accountants now assert that they relied on
the lawyers; the lawyers insist that they have no responsibility for
accounting matters. But the distinction between legal and accounting issues
is difficult to draw. Some of the criteria under the relevant accounting
standard are legal, and the standard explicitly calls for a legal judgment on a
central issue. If, as appears, this is a matter that is best resolved by
interdisciplinary judgment, any effort to compartmentalize responsibility
between professions is bound to be arbitrary, and to the extent it encourages
efforts to exploit ambiguity to escape responsibility, counterproductive.
Effective practice in this area will require lawyers and accountants each to
be familiar with the elements of the others' discipline that bear on the
problems they work on together.
Lawyers are wary of explicit multidisciplinary practice. Key segments of
the bar are threatened by the idea of lawyers practicing in the same firms as
other professionals, and have so far managed to prohibit it in most
jurisdictions. They would no doubt resist efforts to impose uniform
practice norms on the members of different professions working in the same
practice areas. The ideology of confidentiality plays a strong role in this
area.
The bar has succeeded in achieving stronger confidentiality
protections than competing professions for lawyers' consultations with
clients. (Accountants, bankers, and business consultants are sometimes
asked to leave the boardroom when lawyers discuss sensitive issues with
directors, for fear of jeopardizing the attorney-client privilege.)
This is a great marketing advantage for lawyers, but as I suggested
above, the social benefits of attorney-client confidentiality are unproven and
the benefits to corporate clients are vastly exaggerated. A little-noticed cost
of confidentiality is that it undermines accountability, not only of clients,
but of the lawyers themselves. Confidentiality prevents review and
assessment of the quality of much legal advice. The loss of confidentiality
is not an inadvertent by-product of the interdisciplinary team model, but a
consequence of its core commitment to transparency and professional
accountability. This model is designed to force professionals to be as clear
and articulate as possible to each other about their judgments, both to force
reflection and to facilitate cross-disciplinary peer review. 16 Regan's Enron
story is a prime example of the costs of disciplinary parochialism and
15. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1139 (2005).

16. Doff and Sabel foresee the emergence of "a new conception of a profession,
consisting of a loosely defined subject matter, a set of core skills, generalized partnering
disciplines, and a commitment to making reasonably explicit (as opposed to tacit) the
corrigible principles that enable practitioners to succeed." Dorf & Sabel, supra note 14, at
864.
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IV. How MUCH PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY? LETTER OR SPIRIT OF THE LAW?

Enron-style transactions designed solely to achieve misleadingly
favorable accounting results and aggressive tax shelters have in common
that they are designed to conform to the literal terms of the applicable law
while flouting its underlying values. These transactions have no business
purposes. They are undertaken solely to achieve benefits for the clients (or,
in the Enron case, the managers) that the lawyers, were they to make a
judgment on the matter, would probably concede were inconsistent with the
spirit of the law.
Of course, there is a good deal of dispute about whether these
transactions comply even with the letter of the law. But the lawyers argue
that they do and, more importantly, that compliance with its letter is all that
the law requires. Thus, for example, Vinson & Elkins has defended its
work for Enron by arguing that lawyers have a duty to exploit "loopholes"
17
in the law, and it has found many defenders.
Every lawyer recognizes public responsibilities to respect the law, but the
profession has long been ambivalent or divided over the competing
conceptions of legal fidelity based, respectively, on letter and spirit. In the
post-Enron era, the formalist letter-of-the-law position seems to be harder to
defend.
First, the law itself is increasingly demanding respect for its spirit as well
as its letter. Although the issue remains contested, judges and regulators
seem increasingly inclined to interpret the law purposively and they refuse
to recognize literal compliance as justification for conduct that knowingly
and flagrantly thwarts clear underlying purposes.
Second, both the dignity of the bar and its status and privileges depend
on the idea that lawyering serves public values. The premise of the
attorney-client evidentiary privilege, for example, is that confidentiality
encourages people to consult lawyers, and that it is socially desirable for
people to do so. But the formalistic conception of legal responsibility
undermines the latter claim. If the compliance that lawyers encourage
means nothing more than conformity to the law's literal terms, if legal
advice is as likely to facilitate evasion as vindication of the law's
underlying purposes, then there is no reason to think that there is any social
interest in encouraging consultation with lawyers.
For these reasons, the ability to relate the client's circumstances to the
law's underlying purposes has long been viewed as an essential lawyering
skill. But the Enron-type scandals show how readily it can be jeopardized
by narrow conceptions of responsibility. Milton Regan's detailed account
of the Enron "special purpose entity" transactions nicely dramatizes this
17. Patti Waldmeir, Don't Blame the Lawyers for Enron, Fin. Times, Feb. 21, 2002, at
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point. By immersing us in the details of the transaction, Regan is able to
convey some sense of how the lawyers, viewing the transaction piece by
piece and taking account only of the literal terms of the applicable norms,
might have concluded that they were legitimate. But any lawyer who asked
what was the purpose of a transaction and compared that purpose to the
underlying purpose of the relevant laws would have found it much more
difficult to conclude that what they were doing was acceptable.
The Enron board's Finance Committee was told that the transaction was
a "hedge" that "[d]oes not transfer economic risk but transfers P & L
[income statement profit and loss] volatility."' 18 Of course, a hedge that
does not transfer economic risk is an absurdity. And a transaction that
transfers P & L volatility without affecting economic risk sounds like a
synonym for fraud. Such an answer should have been at least a blazing red
flag for the lawyers. Regan's account suggests that they may never have
asked the kinds of questions that would have elicited it. Such misguided
restraint seems less likely in the post-Enron era.
CONCLUSION

The articles in this collection provide a roadmap to the controversies over
the role of the business lawyer in what is likely to prove a watershed period
in the history of the profession.

18. Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp., Report of
Investigation (Feb. 1, 2002), at 157.

